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Abstract
This original research hypothesises that the most fundamental building blocks
of logical descriptions of cognitive, or knowledge, agents’ descriptions are ex-
pressible based on their conceptions (of the world). This article conceptually
and logically analyses agents’ conceptions in order to offer a constructivist-
based logical model for terminological knowledge. The most significant char-
acteristic of [terminological] knowing is that there are strong interrelationships
between terminological knowledge and the individualistic constructed, and to-
be-constructed, models of knowledge. Correspondingly, I conceptually and log-
ically analyse conception expressions based on terminological knowledge, and
I show how terminological knowledge may reasonably be assumed to be con-
structed based on the agents’ conceptions of the world. The focus of my model
is on terminological knowledge structures, which may find applications in such
diverse fields as the Semantic Web and educational/learning systems.
Key words: Terminological knowledge; Constructivist Epistemology; Logic;
Concept; Conception; Conception’s Effect
1 Introduction
In this article, I shall reflect on, and interpret, the phenomenon of knowledge from
the perspective of constructivist epistemology1 (see Piaget, 1967; Glasersfeld, 1984;
∗B badie@id.aau.dk
1The term “epistemology” is derived from episteme (Ancient Greek: epistēmē). It is worth men-
tioning that Michel Foucault (1966) uses the term“epistēmē” to designate the a priori knowledge that
grounds truth and discourses, thus representing the condition of their possibility within a particular
epoch. In the framework of constructivism, there might be some similarities between my notion of
epistemology and Foucault’s epistemes.
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Husén & Postlethwaite, 1989; Glasersfeld, 1989; Sjøberg, 2010). This expression was
first used by Jean Piaget in 1967 in a direct reference to the mathematician L. E.
J. Brouwer and his constructivism in mathematics.2 In a very broad sense, con-
structivist epistemology—based on what can be called the developmental theory of
knowledge—deals with the question of whether, and under which conditions, an indi-
vidual may construct their own knowledge structures and produce their understanding
of the world. One could say that such an epistemology is concerned with the howness
of meaning construction based on the cognitive, or knowledge, agents’ (henceforth
simply “agents”) experiences of, as well as on their conceptual/mental backgrounds
about, the world. Correspondingly, it is assumed that there is a strong dependency
between the constructed knowledge and the agent’s conceptual models of knowing (in
the mind/a knowledge base).
This research presupposes that knowing the world is not just seeing (and finding
out about) something (some phenomenon); it is actually constructing it. As it will be
made clearer in the next Section, this conception of knowing is significantly in line with
Jerome Bruner’s cognitive learning theory. I shall assume that knowing is a process
of constructing knowledge [structures] in the mind, as well as in any other knowledge
base. Consequently, knowledge can be understood as a compendium of (and, in
fact, a construction based on) conceptual entities, conceptual relationships, and rules
that have proven to be useful in expressing an agent’s experiential world in the form
of conceptions. In my view, and in the framework of constructivist epistemology,
agents conceptually-logically-terminologically offer their conceptual expressions and,
correspondingly, become concerned with the specification(s) of their conceptualisation
through inferential and learning processes.
This paper informally conceptualises agents’ conceptions of the world.3 Accord-
ingly, it theoretically analyses terminological knowledge. As the most significant con-
tribution, it focuses on how terminological knowledge may reasonably be assumed to
be constructed based on the agents’ conceptions of the world.
2 Theoretical Background
Giambattista Vico coined the phrase “verum est ipsum factum” and explained that
“to know something means to know what parts it is made of and how they have been
put together” (Vico, 1710/2005; Glasersfeld, 1995). This means/entails that an agent
can know [about] their personal built-up conceptual and other mental constructions
and can reflect these knowings on their experiences of the world.
Jerome Bruner paid special attention to the significance of categorisation (classifi-
cation) in knowledge acquisition, as well as to knowledge construction, processes. He
believed that all cognitive activities of human beings involve categories. In Bruner’s
view, to perceive is to categorise, to conceptualise is to categorise, to learn is to form
categories, and to make decisions is to categorise (see Bruner & Austin, 1956; Bruner,
1973; Bruner, 1986; Bruner, 1990; Bruner & Kalmar, 1998). Moreover, according
2L. E. J. Brouwer was, so to say, a life-long constructivist. His constructivism was firstly elab-
orated on in Brouwer (1907), his doctoral dissertation at the University of Amsterdam. See, e.g.,
Posy (1974) for a discussion of the evolution of Brouwer’s constructivism.
3For a more formal discussion, see Badie (2020; 2017b).
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to Bruner, knowing includes information selection, information transformation, de-
cision making, generating hypotheses, and constructing meaning from information
and experiences (see Foerster, 1981; Glasersfeld, 1984). I shall summarise his views
by saying that categorisation is the process of constructing knowledge (bases); it is
dependent on representations, and it is by means thereof that human beings make
sense of their world. Furthermore, incoming information is organised in terms of pre-
existing classes, or humans create new ones; where humans cannot perceive things,
they go beyond the information given and make inferences based on what they do
really know. It is interesting to remark that the constructivist view does not rule out
inferential relations between different categories.
In my view, and as I have argued for in Badie (2017c), knowing is an active and
dynamic process of knowledge construction. In fact, agents produce their concep-
tions based upon their pre-conceptions of (as well as background knowledge about)
the world. Conceptions of the world are in an important sense expressed in many
forms in a universe of discourse. Conceptions are rooted in presuppositions (and pre-
conceptions). They are also open to being revised and updated. This means that a
conception (of the world) is corrigible and is capable of being annulled.
3 Concepts
Over the years, the term “concept” has been used differently by many authors (Kant,
1781/2007; Bartlett, 1932; Peacocke, 1992; Allwood, 1999; Hampton & Moss, 2003;
Margolis & Laurence, 2007; Margolis & Laurence, 2010; Götzsche, 2013; Margolis &
Laurence, 2015). For Götzsche (2013) and Badie (2017c), concepts offer a linkage
between the mental representations of linguistic expressions and the other mental
images (e.g., representations of the world, representations of inner experiences) that
an agent has in the mind or in a knowledge base.
According to Allwood (1999), we can discern three fundamental and traditional
positions that apply to what a concept is. (i) Concepts are abstract phenomena which
exist outside the mind and are completely independent of space and time. This posi-
tion, first advocated by Plato, is called conceptual realism and it is currently espoused
by many mathematicians and logicians. According to conceptual realism, concepts are
eternal and unchangeable phenomena. Subsequently, concepts are assumed to have
a real existence. (ii) Concepts are mental phenomena that are construed by human
beings. This position is usually called conceptualism. Conceptualism is currently the
most common view among psychologists, linguists, and cognitive scientists. Concep-
tualism was first advocated by Aristotle and the medieval semanticist Abelard. (iii)
Concepts do not really exist. The only things that exist are (a) linguistic expressions
and (b) things (both real and ideal) in the world that linguistic expressions can rep-
resent. In this view, our direct experience of the world is often identified with the
world itself. This third position is usually called nominalism. According to nominal-
ism, concepts are reduced to a name, linguistic expression, and/or symbol. Currently,
nominalistic views are found among linguists, philosophers, logicians and psycholo-
gists who are influenced by so-called behaviourism. Nominalism originally emerged in
antiquity in opposition to Platonic conceptual realism.
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4 Conceptions
In my view, concepts are mental phenomena/entities that are construed by agents in
a particular state of awareness. More specifically, concepts are produced based on the
agents’ conceptualisation (of the world), as well as on their social linguistic interactions
and communications, which all require some degree of awareness. Interpreted in this
way, these psychological suppositions are in line with conceptualism. So, the way I see
it, concepts are the primary/fundamental units of humans’ [terminological] knowledge
and are the basic “materials” of humans’ constructed meanings. Concepts are non-
physical entities that are classifiable and serialisable in minds. They can be identified
with the contents in, e.g., linguistic expressions, formal expressions, and/or numerical
expressions. It follows that humans can reflect on/represent [the classes of] conceptual
entities in artificial agents’ knowledge bases, in order to [metaphorically] train them
and to implement them in diverse machine learning paradigms.
This paper attempts to analyse concepts logically, in order to deal with terminolog-
ical knowledge. In more suitable words, this research draws on nominal conceptualism
(as I have introduced in Badie, 2020). Summing up this position, agents who are in
some way aware of expressing their own descriptions of the world based on their
mental concepts deal with their linguistic expressions that are spoken, written, and
represented based on, e.g., letters, numbers, symbols. In more proper words, humans
need to become “concerned” with the production of their conceptions of the world.
Therefore, in my theoretical model, conceptions are the consequences of concepts.
As mentioned above, concepts are the basic “materials” of meanings. It follows
that meanings can be regarded as conceptual structures (of concepts, as well as of
conceptions). From a dynamic-semantical perspective, meanings can be regarded as
some functions from pre-conceptions into conceptions (and, in fact, from conceptions
into conceptions’ updated forms). Regarding meanings as conception-update func-
tions, any meaning is a dynamic conceptual structure that becomes updated over
time.
It is an underlying research hypothesis of this paper that the most fundamental
building blocks of humans’ descriptions of (as well as statements about, specifications
of, explanations of, justifications for, questions about, answers about) the world are
expressible based on their conceptions.
Let me offer an example for the concept ‘book’. Suppose that Bob has a concep-
tion of the concept ‘book’. Bob, based on his conception of ‘book’, defines the concept
‘book’ as a ‘certain kind of a collection of written sheets’. This concept definition can
be expressed in Bob’s relevant descriptions, explanations, justifications, questions, and
answers in various contexts. Relying on Bob’s conception that ‘Book is a certain kind
of a collection of written sheets’, there is a mental and conceptual assignment from
the description ‘certain kind of a collection of written sheets’ to the conceptual entity
‘book’. Considering the proposition ‘Book is a certain kind of a collection of written
sheets’, two concurrent relationships (i.e. a (i) hyperonym-hyponym or SuperClass-
SubClass relationship and a (ii) hyponym-hyperonym or SubClass-SuperClass rela-
tionship) between the concept ‘book’ and the description ‘certain kind of a collection
of written sheets’ has been constructed. Consequently, all characteristics, features
and properties of ‘certain kind of a collection of written sheets’ are transformed into
‘book’, and vice-versa. Accordingly, considering Bob’s conception (that ‘Book is a cer-
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tain kind of a collection of written sheets’), the concept ‘book’ is logically-semantically
transformed into the propositional-like conception ‘Book is a certain kind of a collec-
tion of written sheets’ and this can, in turn, be transformed into the entity ‘book’.
So, Bob has conceptualised that there is a logical-semantic equivalence between
a conceptual entity and a proposition. Such a logical-semantic equivalence has pro-
duced a hypothesis for Bob’s inferential and learning processes. In addition, regarding
this hypothesis, Bob—by means of ‘is a’—has constructed a logical-terminological re-
lationship between the conceptual entity ‘book’ and the description ‘certain kind of
a collection of written sheets’. Note that Bob’s hypothesis is posed based on his
conceptions of ‘certain’, ‘kind’, ‘collection’, ‘written’ and ‘sheet’. Also, Bob’s con-
ception of ‘book’ is involved in, and is logically-terminologically subsumed under, his
conceptions of ‘certain’, ‘kind’, ‘collection’, ‘written’ and ‘sheet’. In this example, an
agent’s conception of a concept has been expressed in terms of a few of his other pre-
conceptions. One may notice that Bob is—based on his research, experiments, and
interactions with other agents—always able to update his conception of ‘book’ and, in
fact, to reuse his current conception as the pre-conception of his future conception(s).
For the logical assessment of conceptions, any conception (of a concept) and its in-
terconnections with other conceptions can—by means of predication4—be represented
by symbols (see Badie, 2016a; 2017a). For example, for the logical-terminological as-
sessment of one’s conception of the concept ‘dog’, the mental entity ‘Dog’ and its
logical-terminological interrelationships with any other conceptual entity is predica-
ble and representable.
5 Logical Analysis of Conception Expression
In order to assess an agent’s conceptions logically we may represent the conception-
based terminological knowledge over the triple 〈C,S, E〉, where C, S, and E stand for
concept , singular , and effect , respectively (see my research in Badie, 2020). Let me
be more specific:
• A conception (of some concept C)5 is correlated with a [distinct] conceptual
entity.
• A singular S (e.g., brian, spaghetti, skype) is an instance of a conception
(of a concept C). It can be interpreted as follows: any singular is an example,
as well as a single occurrence, of a conception. Moreover, a singular can be
classified under (and labelled by) a specific conception. In fact, by their semantic
interpretations, agents can transform any singular into a specific conception (of
the world).
• An effect E (of a conception of a concept C) expresses a relationship between
a singular (that has been conceptualised to be the instance of C) and other
singulars (that are also conceptualised to be the instances of either C or any
other concept). In addition, an effect (of a conception of C) has the ability to
4As I have argued for in Badie (2017a), the predication of a conception is concerned with the
question: “What does it mean to state something about that conception?” Actually, any predication
is meant to describe and express what there is for a produced conception.
5See elaboration above.
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assign a property/attribute to a singular (that is, in fact, covered/identified by
C).
Any singular can be related to itself by means of the effect of valence 0. Specifically,
interpreted via predicate logic, singulars are equivalent to constant symbols and can be
regarded as 0-ary functions (that are mapped into constant symbols from themselves).
Assertional conception-based descriptions like, e.g., ‘Brian is a philosopher.’, ‘Ravi-
oli is a [kind of] food.’, and ‘Skype is a computer application.’ are expressed based
on the effects of valence 1. One may suggest that any effect of valence 1 is (or can
be) addressed by ‘is a’ in a description in order to express the concept of ‘being’.
According to the description ‘Ravioli is a [kind of] food.’, the singular ravioli has
been conceptualised and described based on the conception of ‘food’. From the per-
spective of predicate logic, one’s conception of a concept can be interpreted as being
“equivalent” to a unary predicate.
Assertional effect-based descriptions like, e.g., ‘Brian is a friend of Maria.’, ‘Ravioli,
spaghetti, and arancini are cooked here.’, and ‘Skype is developed by Microsoft.’ are
expressed based on the effects of valences greater than 1. Regarding the description
‘Skype is developed by Microsoft.’, the singulars skype and microsoft (that are the
instances of the conceptions of two concepts) are conceptualised and realised to be
related to each other by means of the effect ‘is developed by’. In other words, the
singular skype has—by means of the effect ‘is developed by’—effected the singular
microsoft. Equivalently and symmetrically, the singular microsoft has—by means
of the effect ‘is developed by’—been effected by the singular skype. Considering the
description ‘Ravioli, spaghetti, and arancini are cooked here.’, the singulars ravioli,
spaghetti and arancini are conceptualised and realised to be related to each other
by means of the effect ‘are cooked’. Assessed from the viewpoint of predicate logic,
effects are logically equivalent to n-ary predicates.
6 Logical Analysis of Terminological Knowledge
Suppose that C1 and C2 stand for two concepts. Let me focus on some agent x.
Basically, x’s conceptions of C1 and of C2 are comparable in two ways. In particular:
• There might be a difference between x’s conception of C1 and x’s conception
of C2. The interpretation is, then, that x’s conception of C1 is semantically
independent of x’s conception of C2. That is, there is no conceptual-logical
and no terminological relationship between x’s conceptions of C1 and of C2. In
fact, conceptualising and knowing (by x) that there is no conceptual, logical and
semantic interconnection between these two conceptions, does not construct any
terminological knowledge about C1 and C2 in x’s mind or knowledge base.
• There might be a relationship (or more relationships) between x’s conception
of C1 and x’s conception of C2. Therefore, we can interpret that x’s concep-
tion of C1 (or C2) is semantically dependent on x’s conception of C2 (or C1).
More specifically, there is/are conceptual, logical as well as terminological, re-
lationship(s) between x’s conceptions of C1 and of C2, respectively. Therefore,
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conceptualising and knowing (by x) that there is/are conceptual, logical and se-
mantic interconnection(s) between x’s two conceptions, can certainly constitute
a building block of terminological knowledge about C1 and C2 in x’s mind or
knowledge base. Considering the fact that x’s conceptions of C1 and of C2 are
relevant to (and dependent on) each other, we can conclude the following:
– A. There might be a relationship of equivalence between x’s conception of
C1 and x’s conception of C2. So one may interpret that x’s conception of
C1 is semantically equivalent to x’s conception of C2. In fact, there is a
clear conceptual, logical, and terminological relationship between x’s con-
ceptions of C1 and of C2. Obviously, conceptualising and knowing (by x)
that there is a direct and strong conceptual, logical, and semantic equiv-
alence between the two conceptions can certainly produce an instance of
terminological knowledge about C1 and C2 in x’s mind or knowledge base.
– B. There might be a relationship of subsumption between x’s conception of
C1 and x’s conception of C2. More specifically, x’s conception of C1 might
be subsumed under x’s conception of C2. This means that x’s conception
of C1 is x’s sub-conception of C2. Therefore, there is a clear conceptual,
logical, and terminological relationship between x’s conceptions of C1 and
of C2. Consequently, conceptualising and knowing (by x) that there is a di-
rect and strong conceptual, logical, and semantic subsumption interconnec-
tion between the two conceptions can certainly construct a terminological
knowledge about C1 and C2 in x’s mind or knowledge base.
I shall now, and based on an agent’s conceptions of the world, logically analyse a ter-
minological knowledge model. According to the first item, we may conclude that there
is no way to model terminological knowledge when two conceptions of an agent are
irrelevant to (and independent of) each other. But obviously an agent’s conceptions
of the world are terminologically describable based on the second item above. Corre-
spondingly, terminological knowledge can fundamentally be modelled in the following
forms:
Conception equivalence. Conception equivalence means conception of concept equiv-
alence. Suppose that the logical term C1 ≡ C2 represents the description ‘it is
conceptualised that the conception of the concept C1 is equivalent to the concep-
tion of the concept C2’. Accordingly, we can have the description ‘it is conceptu-
alised that the conception C1 is equivalent to the conception C2’. Semantically,
the agent may interpret that the conception C1 is equal to the conception C2. For
example, Mary conceptualises that the concepts ‘husband’ and ‘male spouse’ are
equivalent (note that I am not dealing with the truth/falsity of Mary’s concep-
tion, but only with the logical-terminological structure of her conception). In
fact, regarding Mary’s terminological knowledge, her conceptions of ‘husband’
and ‘male spouse’ are equivalent.
Effect equivalence. Regarding the effect equivalence E1 ≡ E2, the agent may concep-
tualise that the effect E1 is equivalent to the effect E2. Semantically, they may
interpret that E1 is equal to E2. It is worth noticing that effect equivalence means
conception of relation (effect) equivalence. For example, Ann may conceptualise
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that ‘to observe something’ is equivalent to ‘to see something’. For instance,
she may conceptualise that ‘Ann observes the sun’ is equivalent to ‘Ann sees
the sun’. Based on Ann’s terminological knowledge, there is an effect[-based]
equivalence between ‘Ann observes the sun’ and ‘Ann sees the sun’. However,
effect equivalences are dependent on (and are expressed based on) conception
equivalences. Correspondingly, the agent may conceive the following interpreta-
tion: ‘the conception of the effect of the conception of the concept ‘observation’
is equivalent to ‘the conception of the effect of the conception of the concept
‘sight’ ’. This is, in fact, expressible based on ‘the conception of ‘observation’ is
equivalent to ‘the conception of ‘sight’ ’.
Conception subsumption. According to C1 v C2, the agent may conceptualise that
the conception C1 (that is, in fact, the conception of the concept C1) is subsumed
under the conception C2 (the conception of the concept C2). Semantically, the
agent may interpret that C1 is the sub-conception of C2. For example, regarding
John’s conception, ‘flowers are plants’. Consequently, considering John’s termi-
nological knowledge, his conception of ‘flower’ is subsumed under his conception
of ‘plant’.
Effect subsumption. Regarding the effect subsumption E1 v E2, the agent may con-
ceptualise that the effect E1 is subsumed under the effect E2. Semantically, it
is interpreted that E1 is the sub-effect of E2. For example, James has conceptu-
alised that ‘To learn is to memorise’. For instance, he may conceptualise that
‘James learns history’ is ‘James memorises history’. According to James’ termi-
nological knowledge, ‘James learns history’ is subsumed under ‘James memorises
history’. However, effect subsumptions are dependent on conception subsump-
tions. Actually, the agent may interpret that ‘the conception of the effect of the
conception of the concept ‘learning” is subsumed under ‘the conception of the
effect of the conception of the concept ‘memorisation”. This is, in fact, express-
ible based on the equivalence between the conceptions of the concepts ‘learning’
and ‘memorisation’.
Summing up the above, we have the following theoretical results with respect to
terminological knowledge:
• Terminological knowledge is an individually oriented structural model of knowl-
edge.
• Terminological knowledge is fundamentally modelled based on an agent’s con-
ceptions of: (i) concept equivalences, (ii) relation (and property) equivalences,
(iii) concept subsumptions, and (iv) relation (and property) subsumptions. Ac-
tually, by building their terminological knowledge, agents attempt to satisfy
their conceptual-terminological principles based on their conceptions of (i), (ii),
(iii) and (iv).
• Terminological knowledge is logically expressible over the triple 〈C,S, E〉.
• The most fundamental terminological rule in a terminological knowledge model
is that an agent’s conceptions are, in the forms of equalities and subsumptions,
modelled hierarchically in order to create terminologies.
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7 Detailed Analysis of Conception Expression based
on Terminological Knowledge
Above, I have assumed that—based on their terminological knowledge—agents are
able to express their conceptions of the world. In what follows, I shall categorise
the most salient logical characteristics of conception expression based on an agent’s
terminological knowledge.
I: Dealing with semantic valuation of conceptions. One may assume that any
agent has a conception of the concepts ‘Truth’ and ‘Falsity’. Accordingly, by
semantic valuation, agents become“concerned”with the truth and falsity of their
available conceptions of the world. In other words, regarding their conceptions
of Truth and Falsity, they evaluate their conception of any specific concept. This
semantic valuation of conceptions is describable in the following ways:
1. A truth conception that conceptualises and interprets the truth, as well as
the validity and the acceptability, of an available conception of a concept
based on all possible interpretations of that concept (by the agent).
2. A falsity conception that conceptualises and interprets the falsity, as well
as the invalidity and the unacceptability, of an available conception of a
concept based on all possible interpretations of that concept (by the agent).
II: Conception expression based on conception/effect construction. A con-
ception construction is the production, as well as the development of, new con-
ceptions based on the agent’s available conceptions of the world. Conception
constructions are usually produced in the following forms:
1. A conception implication that produces/entails a new conception from an
agent’s available conception of the world. For example, the conception of
‘instructor’ can be constructed based on the conception of ‘teacher’. Ac-
cording to conception implication, a new conception (of an agent), like C2,
can be drawn (in the mind or in a knowledge base) from their own available
conception, like C1, although C1 is not (might not be) explicitly stated in
their descriptions. Relying on conception implications, effect implications
are analysable. For example, regarding an agent’s terminological knowl-
edge, the conception of ‘to be coloured’ can be produced based on the
conception of ‘to be green’.
2. A conception opposition that expresses the absence of an agent’s avail-
able conception of the world. An opposition (or negation) of a specific
conception (of an agent) invalidates and annuls that conception. For ex-
ample, regarding an agent’s terminological knowledge, the conception of
‘no person’ can be constructed based on the conception of ‘person’. By
considering conception oppositions, effect oppositions are analysable. For
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example, regarding an agent’s terminological knowledge, the conception of
‘not to read a book’ can be produced based on the conception of ‘to read
a book’.
3. A conception conjunction that produces the intersection (as well as the
coincidence and concurrence) of two, or more, available conceptions of the
world. For example, considering an agent’s terminological knowledge, the
conception of ‘big brown bear’ can be constructed based on the concep-
tions of ‘bear’, ‘brown’ and ‘big’. By considering conception conjunctions,
effect conjunctions are analysable. For example, regarding an agent’s ter-
minological knowledge, the conception of ‘to read a book and smile’ can
be produced based on the conceptions of ‘to read a book’ and ‘to smile’.
4. A conception disjunction that separates two, or more, available conceptions
of the world. In fact, conception disjunction deals with the incoherence and
disconnections of two, or more, conceptions. For example, in consideration
of an agent’s terminological knowledge, the conception of ‘brown or red’
can be made for choosing the colour of a chair, based on the conceptions of
‘brown’ and ‘red’. More specifically, from the assertional point of view, an
agent’s conception of ‘brown or red chair’ can be made based on the con-
ceptions of ‘brown chair’ and ‘red chair’. Taking into account conception
disjunctions, effect disjunctions are analysable. For example, by consid-
ering an agent’s terminological knowledge, the conception of ‘to write or
play’ (for choosing one’s favourite activity) is creatable based on the con-
ceptions of ‘to write’ and ‘to play’. More particularly, from the assertional
point of view, an agent’s conception of ‘to write an article or play chess’ is
made based on the conceptions of ‘to write an article’ and ‘to play chess’.
5. A conception quantification that quantificationally assesses and appraises
the available conceptions of the world. For example, regarding an agent’s
terminological knowledge, the conceptions of ‘some birds’ and ‘all birds’
are creatable based on the conception of, a (specific) group of, ‘birds’.
Conception quantifications and effect quantifications are strongly tied to-
gether. In fact, the quantification of an agent’s conception(s) is dependent
on the quantification of their conceptions’ properties. In more adequate
words, the quantification of an agent’s conception(s) is dependent on the
quantification of their conceptions’ effects (on their other conceptions). For
example, an agent that has made their conception of ‘some birds’ or ‘all
birds’, has, in fact, quantified the available conception of ‘birds’, as well
as of ‘their properties (e.g., their breeds, their colours, their sizes, their
songs)’.
6. A conception qualification that qualificationally evaluates the available con-
ceptions of the world. For example, taking into consideration an agent’s
terminological knowledge, the conception of ‘beautiful girl’ can be made.
Note that conception qualification is related to conception conditioning
(see below). Conception qualifications and effect qualifications are related
to each other. This means that the qualification of an agent’s conceptions
is dependent on the qualification of their conceptions’ properties and, in
fact, on the qualification of their conceptions’ effects (on their other concep-
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tions). For example, the agent (who has made the conception of ‘beautiful
girl’) has qualified their conception of ‘girl’ as well as of ‘girls’ properties’.
III: Dealing with conception/effect classification. By means of conception clas-
sification, agents categorise and collect their available conceptions of the world.
For example, taking into consideration an agent’s terminological knowledge,
the conceptions of ‘tree’ and ‘flower’ may be classified under the conception of
‘plant’. In other words, the conceptions of ‘tree’ and ‘flower’ are subsumed under
the conception of ‘plant’. Semantically, the conceptions of ‘tree’ and ‘flower’ may
be interpreted as sub-conceptions of ‘plant’. In addition, we can analyse effect
classifications based on conception classifications. Suppose that an agent’s con-
ception of ‘to understand’ (based on their terminological knowledge) is classified
into the conception of ‘to learn’. Subsequently, ‘to understand’ is the sub-effect
of ‘to learn’. More particularly, the conception of ‘to understand German’ is
the sub-effect of, and is interpreted to be subsumed under, the conception of ‘to
learn German’.
IV: Dealing with conception characterisation. By means of conception char-
acterisation agents specify their available conceptions of the world. In other
words, by conception characterisation an agent assigns [indicative] characteris-
tics to their conceptions. For example, an agent may have a conception of ‘a
[specific] breed of dogs’. In fact, by having a conception of ‘a [specific] breed
of dogs’, the agent characterises the conception of ‘dog’. Note that the char-
acterisation of a conception is highly dependent on the characterisation of that
conception’s effects (effect characterisation). Correspondingly, an agent needs
to deal with the specification of the properties (and the attributes) of a group
of dogs (e.g., having brown colour, being big, being smart) in order to produce
the conception of ‘a [specific] breed of dogs’. Consequently, the conception of
‘dog’, as well as of ‘the effects of being [a] dog’, can be characterised (by the
agent).
IV-i: Dealing with conception identification. Conception identification is a prod-
uct of conception characterisation. Agents, by means of conception identifica-
tion, recognise (and, in fact, make identifiers for) their available conceptions of
the world. It should be stressed that the identification of an agent’s conception
is dependent on the identification of the properties of that conception, as well
as of its effects on the agent’s other conceptions. An agent may—based on their
characterisation of their conception of the concept ‘dog’—produce their speci-
fying and identifying conception of ‘dog’. Equivalently, they may produce their
conception of ‘being [a] dog’, as well as of ‘to be [a] dog’.
V: Dealing with functionalised conceptions. By means of conception functional-
isation agents create functions (i.e. functional relations) based on their available
conceptions of the world. For example, one can—based on the conception of
‘to have a mother’—produce the supportive functionalised conception that ‘any
human being has one (and only one) mother’. Obviously, the functionalisation
of an agent’s conception is supported by the functionalisation of the properties
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of that conception, as well as by the functionalisation of that conception’s effects
on other conceptions of the agent.
VI: Dealing with conception states. A conception state is a particular condition
(as well as location and moment) at/in/on which an available conception of
the world has been true. It shall be interpreted that an agent’s conception(s)
has/have been experienced to be true at/in/on [specific] conception states. An
agent who has experienced a true proposition, say P , at/in/on a specific state
of the world may decide to develop their available conception based on the
experienced P . For example, Daniel can—based on his conception of ‘[many]
exams in February’—say ‘I have had many exams in February’. Accordingly, by
mentioning ‘February’, he can make a specific state of his conception of ‘exam’.
VII: Dealing with nominalised conceptions. By means of conception nominal-
isation agents transform their available conceptions of the world into specific
nouns (as well as labels). Suppose that Anna was born on the 25th of March
in 1974. Therefore, she can—by transforming the proposition ‘I was born on
the 25th of March in 1974’ into the noun ‘birthday’ (and, subsequently, into the
noun ‘birth’)—produce her own nominalised conception of ‘birth’. Note that
‘the 25th of March in 1974’ may conceptually and terminologically be regarded
as a specific state of the concept ‘birth’ in Anna’s mind. Therefore, it should be
taken into account that there is a strong correlation between conception state
and conception nominalisation.
VIII: Dealing with conception conditioning. By means of conception condition-
ing agents adapt their available conceptions of the world to specific conditions
(as well as provisos and requirements). For example, one can—by provisioning
the conception of ‘food’—make the [conditioned and provisional] conception of
‘good food’. It is important to remark that conception conditioning and con-
ception qualification (item II-6) are related to each other.
IX: Dealing with conception collation. By means of conception collation an agent
compares their available conceptions of the world with each other. For example,
one can—based on their conceptions of the singulars ‘ubuntu’ and ‘debian’
(that are conceptualised as the instances of ‘Operating System’)—focus on their
conception collation.
X: Dealing with conception enumeration. By means of conception enumeration
agents can assign numbers to their available conceptions of the world (in or-
der to count them). For example, an agent can—based on their conception of
‘blue’—enumerate and count ‘blue flowers’ in the garden.
8 Concluding Remarks
Above, I focused conceptually and logically on a detailed analysis of terminological
knowledge in the framework of constructivist epistemology.
My research hypothesises that the most fundamental building blocks of logical
descriptions of agents’ linguistic and formal expressions are expressible based on their
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conceptions (of the world). Accordingly, I have analysed conception expressions, in
order to model terminological knowledge. Terminological knowledge is a structural
model of knowledge that is fundamentally modelled based on an agent’s conceptions
of concept/relation equivalences and of concept/relation subsumptions. Assessing an
agent’s conceptions logically, we may represent terminological knowledge over the
triple 〈C,S, E〉. More specifically, in order to logically model a fundamental termino-
logical description we utilise the agents’ conceptions, as well as the interrelationships
between singulars (by means of effects).
I have assumed that the central focus of constructivist epistemology is at the origin
of any individual’s constructed terminological knowledge. Thus, constructed termi-
nological knowledge (by an agent) is individually oriented. In such a framework, the
most significant characteristic of knowing is that there are strong interrelationships
between terminological knowledge and the individually oriented constructed and to-
be-constructed models of knowledge. Correspondingly, when analysing terminological
knowledge based on a constructivist model of knowing, we are faced with the ques-
tions of: (i) how an agent can/may know, in order to produce their terminological
knowledge, and (ii) how terminological knowledge may reasonably and logically be
assumed to be constructed by an agent based on their conceptions of the world. Some
important consequences can now be summarily discussed.
According to constructivist terminological knowing, agents construct their own
conceptual versions based on their own conceptions of the world. Assessing this from
the perspective of nominal conceptualism, agents’ own conceptual versions can be
expressed/represented by letters, numbers, symbols, etc. With regard to nominal
conceptualism, the most fundamental building blocks of agents’ descriptions of the
world are expressible based on their conceptions.
As for constructivist terminological knowing, the semantic phenomenon of mean-
ing is interpreted as a conceptual structure that becomes constructed based upon
the agents’ conceptions. More particularly, meanings are functions from agents’ con-
ceptions into their updated forms. Consequently, there are solid interrelationships
between construction and semantic interpretation. In fact, agents [semantically] in-
terpret the world (based on the [semantic] interpretations of their own conceptions)
and subsequently understand the world (by conceptualising, interpreting, and making
sense thereof, based on their own conceptions). Actually, the constructed meanings
(by an agent) become reflected in their understanding of the world (see Badie, 2016b;
2018).
With respect to constructivist terminological knowing, there are robust correla-
tions between constructing and explaining. Therefore, relying on their own concep-
tualisations of the world, agents provide supportive backgrounds for producing their
own meaningful descriptions.
In the framework of constructivism, logical-terminological modelling of termino-
logical knowing relies on the concepts of ‘classification’ and ‘induction’. More specif-
ically, in the framework of constructivist terminological knowing, the inferential and
reasoning processes of concept learning (what I call constructivist concept learning,
see Badie, 2017b; 2017c) are mainly structured based on the conceptual processes of
classification and induction. In fact, I believe that agents specify their conceptualisa-
tion of their conceptions through their inferential and reasoning processes based on
their terminological knowledge.
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The offered model of terminological knowledge has important potential appli-
cations. An application thereof in technological contexts might be in conception-
expression [machine] learning within terminological knowledge structures in semantic
technologies (e.g., the Semantic Web). For instance, it can support inductive rea-
soning6 based on the agents’ conceptions within multi-agent systems (MAS; see, e.g.,
Wooldridge, 2009), computerised systems composed of multiple interacting artificial
agents that are mutually related with the aim of making decisions and/or solving
problems in cooperation among each other. In other words, a significant potential ap-
plication might be in what I call Conception-oriented interaction-based terminological
knowledge building & inductive reasoning in semantic technologies.
Further applications can be envisaged in educational and pedagogical contexts.
This model of terminological knowledge can support the logical analysis of students’
conceptions, in order to improve our comprehension of their conception-based learning
and understanding of specific subjects. This analysis might contribute to a better
understanding by teachers, as well as by educationalists and learning designers, of
the learning processes of students. In particular, it can support the logical analysis of
how a learner can update their conceptions and share their constructed meanings (of
their conceptions) when learning a subject. For example, when learning Geometry,
learners may be asked (by their teachers) to, e.g., name [their conceptions], identify
[their conceptions], explain [their conceptions], analyse [their conceptions], relate and
combine [their conceptions together], justify [based on their conceptions], create [new
conceptions based on their previous conceptions], and hypothesise [based on their
conceptions]. Accordingly, teachers can logically analyse various layers of the learners’
conception-based learning and understanding.
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